Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
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- van den Nouweland, Anne & Borm, Peter & Tijs, Stef, 1992. "Allocation Rules for Hypergraph Communication Situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(3), pages 255-268.
- van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations," Other publications TiSEM b97fb9dd-2acf-470d-b9eb-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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