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Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program

Author

Listed:
  • Yuichiro Kamada

    () (Harvard University)

  • Fuhito Kojima

    () (Stanford University)

Abstract

In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents to rural hospitals, the Japanese government recently introduced "regional caps" which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. The government modifi ed the deferred acceptance mechanism incorporating the regional caps. This paper shows that the current mechanism may result in avoidable ineffciency and instability and proposes a better mechanism that improves upon it in terms of effciency and stability while meeting the regional caps. More broadly, the paper contributes to the general research agenda of matching and market design to address practical problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuichiro Kamada & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program," Discussion Papers 10-011, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-011
    as

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    File URL: http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/10-011.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2010. "Course Bidding At Business Schools," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(1), pages 99-123, February.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 639, Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2009. "Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 717, Boston College Department of Economics.
    4. Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    2. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Westkamp, Alexander, 2012. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental investigation," Kiel Working Papers 1761, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    3. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2014. "The efficiency of labor matching and remuneration reforms: a panel data quantile regression approach with endogenous treatment variables," Working Papers w0206, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    4. Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea & Westkamp, Alexander, 2014. "Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 232-251.
    5. repec:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:201-211 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2015. "Heterogeneous effect of residency matching and prospective payment on labor returns and hospital scale economies," Discussion Papers 15-001, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    medical residency matching; regional caps; the rural hospital theorem; sta- bility; strategy-proofness; matching with contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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