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Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football

Author

Listed:
  • Brad Humphreys

    (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

  • Jane Ruseski

    (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

Abstract

Defection in every period is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with complete information. However, in the presence of incomplete information, players may have an incentive to cooperate in some periods, leading to tit-for-tat strategies. We describe the decision to comply with recruiting regulations or cheat made by NCAA Division IA football programs as a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. The game includes incomplete information about the resources devoted to football programs, the recruiting effort made by rival programs, and the behavior of rival programs. We test for evidence that NCAA Division IA football programs follow tit-for-tat strategies in terms of complying with or defecting from NCAA recruiting rules using panel data from NCAA Division IA football over the period 1976-2005. We find anecdotal and empirical evidence that is consistent with tit-for-tat strategies in this setting. The presence of in-conference rivals under NCAA sanctions increases the probability of a team being placed under sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Brad Humphreys & Jane Ruseski, 2009. "Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football," Working Papers 2009-24, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:albaec:2009_024
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    File URL: https://sites.ualberta.ca/~econwps/2009/wp2009-24.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
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    3. Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, 2006. "NCAA Enforcement and Competitive Balance in College Football," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 826-845, April.
    4. J. Michael Dumond & Allen K. Lynch & Jennifer Platania, 2008. "An Economic Model of the College Football Recruiting Process," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 9(1), pages 67-87, February.
    5. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414, Elsevier.
    6. Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, 2009. "Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 720-735, January.
    7. Fleisher, Arthur III & Shughart, William II & Tollison, Robert D. & Goff, Brian L., 1988. "Crime or punishment? : Enforcement of the NCAA football cartel," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 433-451, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. In Lee, 1999. "Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion, Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 15(2), pages 115-134, September.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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