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Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football


  • Brad R. Humphreys

    () (Department of Economics, 8-14 HM Tory, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada)

  • Jane E. Ruseski

    () (Department of Economics, 8-14 HM Tory, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada)


We investigate self-monitoring and enforcement of the NCAA player recruitment agreement in the context of a cartel model with incomplete information and reaction lags. Empirical results from a panel probit model strongly support the predictions of the model. Lagged winning percentage, the discount rate of the decision maker, the institution’s commitment to nonathletic activities, and the institution’s demand-cost configuration are all important predictors of institutions being placed on probation for violating the cartel rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski, 2009. "Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 720-735, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:75:3:y:2009:p:720-735

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    Cited by:

    1. Pincin, Jared & Hoffer, Adam, 2013. "NCAA Athletic Departments: An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Revenue and Conference Changes," MPRA Paper 49807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. John Fizel & Charles Brown, 2014. "Assessing the Determinants of NCAA Football Violations," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(3), pages 277-290, September.
    3. Humphreys, Brad & Ruseski, Jane, 2009. "Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football," Working Papers 2009-24, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General


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