Intermediaries as Information Aggregators
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References listed on IDEAS
- Dong Lou & Hongjun Yan & Jinfan Zhang, 2013.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2016.
"Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11731, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2017. "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," IESE Research Papers D/1162, IESE Business School.
- Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2017. "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," Working Papers 2072/292436, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Carolina Manzano & Xavier Vives, 2016. "Market Power and Welfare in Asymmetric Divisible Good Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 6261, CESifo.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BAN-2015-08-01 (Banking)
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