On the Provision of Public Goods in Dynamic Contracts: Lack of Commitment
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
- Kehoe, Timothy J & Levine, David K, 2001. "Liquidity Constrained Markets versus Debt Constrained Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 575-598, May.
More about this item
Keywordsmutual insurance; lack of commitment; optimal dynamic contract; public good;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-01-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-01-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IAS-2007-01-13 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2007-01-13 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed006:860. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .