Commitment Problems and the Political Economy of States and Mafias
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|Date of creation:||2005|
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- Frye, Timothy & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2000.
"Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 478-502, October.
- Frye, Timothy & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2001. "Rackets, Regulation and the Rule of Law," CEPR Discussion Papers 2716, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Timothy Frye & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2000. "Rackets, Regulation and the Rule of Law," Working Papers w0002, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Konstantin Sonin, 2002.
"Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
544, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 715-731, December.
- Konstantin Sonin, 2003. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," Working Papers w0022, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Varese, Federico, 2001. "The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297369, March.
- Braguinsky, Serguey, 1999. "Enforcement of Property Rights during the Russian Transition: Problems and Some Approaches to a New Liberal Solution," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 515-44, June.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
- Alexeev, Michael & Janeba, Eckhard & Osborne, Stefan, 2004. "Taxation and evasion in the presence of extortion by organized crime," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 375-387, September.
- Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May.
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