Social Security and the Failure of Annuity Markets
This paper investigates the effect of asymmetric information on the annuities market when individuals differ in the probability of dying. Individual behaviour under live-insured and term-insured annuities is investigated. Unlike well-known results of Rothschild and Stiglitz, if an equilibrium exists, it must be a pooling equilibrium. Given the same information as the private sector, a planner can achieve an optimum under certain circumstances.
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