IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/98121.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies

Author

Listed:
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo
  • Navarro-Ramos, Adriana

Abstract

This paper considers agglomeration economies. A new firm is planning to open a plant in a country divided into several regions. Each firm receives a positive externality if the new plant is located in its region. In a decentralized mechanism, the plant would be opened in the region where the new firm maximizes its individual benefit. Due to the externalities, it could be the case that the aggregated utility of all firms is maximized in a different region. Thus, the firms in the optimal region could transfer something to the new firm in order to incentivize it to open the plant in that region. We propose two rules that provide two different schemes for transfers between firms already located in the country and the newcomer. The first is based on cooperative game theory. This rule coincides with the nucleolus and the t-value of the associated cooperative game. The second is defined directly. We provide axiomatic characterizations for both rules. We characterize the core of the cooperative game. We prove that both rules belong to the core.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo & Navarro-Ramos, Adriana, 2020. "Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies," MPRA Paper 98121, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:98121
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98121/1/MPRA_paper_98121.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sanchez-Soriano, Joaquin, 2006. "Pairwise solutions and the core of transportation situations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(1), pages 101-110, November.
    2. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Glenn Ellison & Edward L. Glaeser & William R. Kerr, 2010. "What Causes Industry Agglomeration? Evidence from Coagglomeration Patterns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1195-1213, June.
    4. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2015. "The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 78-92.
    5. María Gómez-Rúa & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2011. "Merge-proofness in minimum cost spanning tree problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 309-329, May.
    6. Muto, S. & Nakayama, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1988. "On big boss games," Other publications TiSEM 488a314a-179c-4628-91e6-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Kar, Anirban, 2002. "Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 265-277, February.
    8. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    9. Stuart S. Rosenthal & William C. Strange, 2003. "Geography, Industrial Organization, and Agglomeration," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(2), pages 377-393, May.
    10. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    11. Eric Bahel, 2014. "On the core and bargaining set of a veto game," Working Papers e07-48, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Tijs, S., 1981. "Bounds for the core of a game and the t-value," Other publications TiSEM ebc650eb-f25e-4802-ba0b-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2007. "The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 223-239, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2020. "Cooperative games for minimum cost spanning tree problems," MPRA Paper 104911, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2021. "A review of cooperative rules and their associated algorithms for minimum-cost spanning tree problems," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 73-100, March.
    3. Fatemeh Babaei & Hamidreza Navidi & Stefano Moretti, 2022. "A bankruptcy approach to solve the fixed cost allocation problem in transport systems," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 30(2), pages 332-358, July.
    4. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Chiu Yu Ko, 2020. "Sharing sequentially triggered losses," IFRO Working Paper 2020/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    5. Eric Bahel, 2019. "On the properties of the nucleolus of a veto game," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 221-234, December.
    6. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2020. "Allocating extra revenues from broadcasting sports leagues," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 65-73.
    7. Trudeau, Christian & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2020. "Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 8-14.
    8. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2020. "Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sport Events," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(6), pages 2417-2431, June.
    9. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2004. "Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake," Other publications TiSEM f9573808-10b5-4a9e-a835-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Marieke Quant & Peter Borm & Hans Reijnierse & Bas van Velzen, 2005. "The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(4), pages 491-503, November.
    11. Liu, Siwen & Borm, Peter & Norde, Henk, 2023. "Induced Rules for Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems : Towards Merge-Proofness and Coalitional Stability," Other publications TiSEM bf366633-5301-4aad-81c8-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Quant, Marieke & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud & Zwikker, Peter, 2006. "Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 247-256, May.
    13. Louis de Mesnard, 2015. "The three wives problem and Shapley value," Post-Print hal-01091714, HAL.
    14. J. Schouten & B. Dietzenbacher & P. Borm, 2022. "The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1117-1135, November.
    15. Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Chiu Yu Ko, 2022. "Sharing sequentially triggered losses: Automatic conflict resolution through smart contracts," IFRO Working Paper 2020/05, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    16. Eiko Arata & Takuhei Shimogawa & Takehiro Inohara, 2022. "A Game Theory-based Verification of Social Norms:An Example from Accounting Rules," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2022-007, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    17. Flip Klijn & Stef Tijs & Marco Slikker, 2001. "A Dual Egalitarian Solution," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(10), pages 1-8.
    18. Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Reijnierse, J.H. & van Velzen, S., 2003. "Compromise Stable TU-Games," Other publications TiSEM 01a28f48-0b1b-43f9-8dac-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Takayuki Oishi & Gerard van der Laan & René van den Brink, 2023. "Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(1), pages 229-258, January.
    20. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2004. "Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake," Discussion Paper 2004-108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; core; axiomatic characterization; agglomeration economies.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:98121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.