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Political Reforms vs. Undemocratic Institutional Arrangements in Hong Kong


  • Scartozzi, Cesare M.


This essay examines the recent political developments in Hong Kong. Specifically, it examines the problem of political accountability and unresponsive governance. The essay argues that lack of accountability is a byproduct of existing institutional arrangements – i.e., limited functional franchise, veto powers and institutional backdoors – which promote rent-seeking behavior among tycoons and undermine the economic freedoms of ordinary Hongkongers, who, dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, demand political reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Scartozzi, Cesare M., 2017. "Political Reforms vs. Undemocratic Institutional Arrangements in Hong Kong," MPRA Paper 91325, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:91325

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Eric Ip, 2015. "The constitution of economic liberty in Hong Kong," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 307-327, September.
    2. Kam C. Wong, 2009. "Chinese Jurisprudence and Hong Kong Law," China Report, , vol. 45(3), pages 213-239, August.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
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    More about this item


    Hong Kong; institutional backdoors; accountability; unresponsive governance.;

    JEL classification:

    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • Y8 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines


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