Structural Determinants of the Natural Rate of Unemployment in Canada
This paper presents empirical estimates of the policy and structural determinants of the natural rate of unemployment in Canada. The paper begins with a discussion of structural features of the economy which impinge on the adjustment of real wages to their equilibrium level. Estimates are presented showing how the generosity of the unemployment insurance system is related to past levels of unemployment. The empirical results indicate that government policies have been largely responsible for changes in the natrual rate, and hence can contribute to a reduction in the natural rate in the medium term.
|Date of creation:||06 Apr 1989|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1987.
"Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
196, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1988. "Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 167-88, March.
- Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986.
"Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem,"
427, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8623. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.