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Confucianism and the Legalism: A Model of the National Strategy of Governance in Ancient China

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  • Zhou, Haiwen

Abstract

The Confucianism school emphasizes family value, moral persuasions, and personal relations. Under Confucianism, there is a free-rider issue in the provision of efforts. Since national officials are chosen through personal relations, they may not be the most capable. The Legalism school emphasizes the usage of incentives and formal institutions. Under the Legalism, the ruler provides strong incentives to local officials which may lead to side effects because some activities are noncontractible. The cold-blood image of the Legalism may alien citizens. By exploiting the paternalistic relationship between the ruler and the ruled under Confucianism and the strength of institution-building under the Legalism, the ruler may benefit from a combination of Confucianism approach and the Legalism approach as the national strategy of governance. As each strategy has its pros and cons, which strategy of is optimal depends on factors such as the minimum enforceable level of public service and the level of institution building costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhou, Haiwen, 2017. "Confucianism and the Legalism: A Model of the National Strategy of Governance in Ancient China," MPRA Paper 81944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:81944
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Haiwen Zhou, 2004. "The division of labor and the extent of the market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 195-209, July.
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    6. Haiwen Zhou, 2009. "Population Growth And Industrialization," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(2), pages 249-265, April.
    7. Haiwen Zhou, 2012. "Internal Rebellions and External Threats: A Model of Government Organizational Forms in Ancient China," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1120-1141, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Siyu Duan & Jun Wang & Hao Yang & Qi Su, 2023. "Disentangling the cultural evolution of ancient China: a digital humanities perspective," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, December.
    2. Angyridis, Constantine & Zhou, Haiwen, 2022. "Search, Technology Choice, and Unemployment," MPRA Paper 112064, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Thomas Barbiero & Haiwen Zhou, 2024. "Culture and Economic Development in Late Comers: Comparing China and India," Working Papers 086, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    4. Haiwen Zhou, 2018. "A Model of Institutional Complementarities in Ancient China," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 286-304, April.
    5. Haiwen Zhou, 2023. "State Capacity and Leadership: Why Did China Take off?," Chinese Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 50-68, January.
    6. Haiwen Zhou, 2021. "Culture, institutions, and long‐run performance," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 372-391, August.
    7. Haiwen Zhou, 2012. "Internal Rebellions and External Threats: A Model of Government Organizational Forms in Ancient China," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(4), pages 1120-1141, April.
    8. Haiwen Zhou, 2023. "Impact of international trade under dual labor markets," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 917-934, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Confucianism; Legalism; national strategy of governance; ancient China; incentive provision; culture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

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