Solving the Social Choice problem under equality constraints
Suppose that a number of equally qualified agents want to choose collectively an element from a set of alternatives defined by equality constraints. Each agent may well prefer a different element, and the social choice problem consists in deciding whether it is possible to design a rule to aggregate all the agents’ preferences into a social choice in an egalitarian way. In this paper we obtain criteria that solve this problem in terms of conditions that are explicitly computable from the constraints. As a theoretical consequence, we show that the only way to avoid running into a social choice paradox consists in designing (if possible) the set of alternatives satisfying certain optimality condition on the constraints, that is, in the natural way from the point of view of economics.
|Date of creation:||27 Jul 2016|
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- Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1983.
"Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 68-87, October.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela & Heal, Geoffrey, 1979. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for a resolution of the social choice paradox," MPRA Paper 8495, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 1981.
- Lauwers, Luc, 2000.
"Topological social choice,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-39, July.
- Luc Lauwers, 1999. "Topological Social Choice," Working Papers Department of Economics ces9912, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Chichilnisky, Graciela, 1979. "On fixed point theorems and social choice paradoxes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 347-351. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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