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Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Accinelli Gamba, Elvio
  • Sánchez Carrera, Edgar J.

Abstract

We claim that economic agents driven by imitative behavior may impact the industrial specialization of national economies. We use a simple two-country model, where workers and firms decide to be skilled (or unskilled) and innovative (or non-innovative). We show that comparative advantages and international trade, under the assumption of a rational strategic behavior of the economic agents, can lead countries towards either an equilibrium with high-social performance or a poverty trap.

Suggested Citation

  • Accinelli Gamba, Elvio & Sánchez Carrera, Edgar J., 2014. "Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory," MPRA Paper 55209, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:55209
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55209/1/MPRA_paper_55209.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Accinelli, Elvio & Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J., 2011. "Strategic complementarities between innovative firms and skilled workers: The poverty trap and the policymaker's intervention," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-40, February.
    2. Daron Acemoglu, 1998. "Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change and Wage Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1055-1089.
    3. Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Coordination failures and government policy: A model with applications to East Asia and Eastern Europe," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-22, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imitation theory and games; population games; trade strategy.;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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