Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory
We claim that economic agents driven by imitative behavior may impact the industrial specialization of national economies. We use a simple two-country model, where workers and firms decide to be skilled (or unskilled) and innovative (or non-innovative). We show that comparative advantages and international trade, under the assumption of a rational strategic behavior of the economic agents, can lead countries towards either an equilibrium with high-social performance or a poverty trap.
|Date of creation:||27 Feb 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Políticas Públicas 1.2(2014): pp. 83-94|
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- Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Coordination failures and government policy: A model with applications to East Asia and Eastern Europe," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-22, February.
- repec:oup:qjecon:v:113:y:1998:i:4:p:1055-1089 is not listed on IDEAS
- Accinelli, Elvio & Sanchez Carrera, Edgar J., 2011. "Strategic complementarities between innovative firms and skilled workers: The poverty trap and the policymaker's intervention," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-40, February.
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