On Weak Condorcet Winners: Existence and Uniqueness
Consider a society where each agent has weak preferences over alternatives. The purpose of the society is the selection of alternatives using the majority principle. Then, an alternative x (a weak Condorcet winner) is selected if half or more agents agree that x is as least as good as any other alternative. We give necessary and sufficient conditions on preference profiles under which (i) the set of Weak Condorcet Winners is non-empty; and (ii) the Weak Condorcet Winner is unique.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in PERSPECTIVAS: Revista de análisis de Economía, Comercio y Negocios Internacionales 1.7(2013): pp. 3-14|
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- Laffond G. & Laslier, J. F. & Le Breton, M., 1996.
"Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
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"On Two New Social Choice Correspondences,"
2000-125, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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