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O Poder das Alianças no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro: Votação de Vetos Presidenciais e de Emendas Constitucionais
[The Power of Alliances in the Brazilian National Congress: Vote on Presidential Vetoes and Constitutional Amendments]

Author

Listed:
  • Masili, Gustavo

Abstract

For any political party wishing to keep the governance of the country, it is crucial to understand the power that each of the other parties can bring to its coalition. This evaluation helps to understand the bargaining power of each party individually. Furthermore, it allows a party to evaluate alternative alliances that may require less counterparts and that offers more power. This paper presents the historical evolution of the theory of voting power and an analysis of the voting power of each of the Brazilian parties, as well as some strategic alliances, for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

Suggested Citation

  • Masili, Gustavo, 2013. "O Poder das Alianças no Congresso Nacional Brasileiro: Votação de Vetos Presidenciais e de Emendas Constitucionais [The Power of Alliances in the Brazilian National Congress: Vote on Presidential Vetoes and Constitutional Amendments]," MPRA Paper 52170, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:52170
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52170/1/MPRA_paper_52170.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dennis Leech & Robert Leech, 2006. "Voting power and voting blocs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 285-303, June.
    2. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, "undated". "Voting Power and Voting Blocs," Economic Research Papers 269610, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    3. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:01:p:40-56_26 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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