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La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario
[Overexploitation of commons and the sole ownership solution]

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  • Fuentes Castro, Daniel

Abstract

The sole ownership solution is an incentive to conserve collective goods but at the same time it can induce a lost of social utility. In the present work the sole ownership solution is analyzed and a synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of collective goods is presented. This paper focuses on the following factors: i) the behaviour of economic agents regarding the social cost linked to the exploitation of collective goods; ii) the market power of the firms exploiting them; iii) the pressure of the demand on the goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuentes Castro, Daniel, 2007. "La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario [Overexploitation of commons and the sole ownership solution]," MPRA Paper 51756, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51756
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51756/1/MPRA_paper_51756.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Keen, E. A., 1983. "Common property in fisheries : Is sole ownership an option?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 197-211, July.
    4. Larson, Bruce A. & Bromley, Daniel W., 1990. "Property rights, externalities, and resource degradation : Locating the tragedy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 235-262, October.
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    6. Alfredo Canavese, 2004. "Commons, anti-commons, corruption and 'maffia' behavior," Law and Economics 0411002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Poppe, Matthijs, 2005. "The specificity of social dilemma situations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 431-441, June.
    8. Carlson, Gerald A. & Zilberman, David & Miranowski, John, 1993. "Agricultural and Resource Economics," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11104, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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