La sobreexplotación de lo colectivo y la solución del único propietario
[Overexploitation of commons and the sole ownership solution]
The sole ownership solution is an incentive to conserve collective goods but at the same time it can induce a lost of social utility. In the present work the sole ownership solution is analyzed and a synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of collective goods is presented. This paper focuses on the following factors: i) the behaviour of economic agents regarding the social cost linked to the exploitation of collective goods; ii) the market power of the firms exploiting them; iii) the pressure of the demand on the goods.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Principios / Revista de Economía Política 8 (2007): pp. 5-19|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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