Borda voting is non-manipulable but cloning manipulation is possible
This paper deals with Borda count which is sincere voting system and originally proposed by French mathematician and philosopher Jeans-Charles Borda. In Borda count a defeated candidate can manipulate the election result in his favor in sincere way by introducing a candidate which is a clone of him and voters ranked this clone candidate immediately below him. In this situation Borda rule is strictly follows but manipulation is possible. The paper shows that this type of manipulation is vulnerable. Both single and simultaneous vulnerabilities of cloning manipulations are discussed with detail calculations and easier ways.
|Date of creation:||19 Nov 2011|
|Date of revision:||10 Jan 2012|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Development Research and Quantitative Techniques 1.2(2012): pp. 28-37|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
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- Truchon, Michel, 2008.
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Mathematical Social Sciences,
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- repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
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- Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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