La atribución de responsabilidades políticas en Estados descentralizados
[The atribution of political responsibilities in decentralized countries]
This article examines the institutional and individual determinants of the correct allocation of political responsibilities in a decentralized country such as Spain. It also deals with the learning process of individuals over time. Our results show that the allocation of powers is more successful when they are exclusively in the hands of the central government and in the so-called "fast track" regions. Moreover, empirical evidence confirms the existence of a learning process. Finally, we show that the impact of individual determinants, such as age or educational level, depends on the policy being studied.
|Date of creation:||28 Feb 2013|
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- McGraw, Kathleen M., 1990. "Avoiding Blame: An Experimental Investigation of Political Excuses and Justifications," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(01), pages 119-131, January.
- Fred Cutler, 2004. "Government Responsibility and Electoral Accountability in Federations," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(2), pages 19-38, Spring.
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