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Autonomy Of Subnational Party Systems: Comparative Analysis Of Federations

Author

Listed:
  • Rostislav Turovsky

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Elizabeth Luizidis

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This research is based on theories of federalized party systems, second-order elections and nationalization of party system comparing long-established democratic federations in terms of actual autonomy of their subnational party systems. The study shows that despite obvious prerequisites for subnational autonomy (such as federal institutions, different timing of elections, freedom to establish regional parties and blocs) most federations have created solidly nationalized party systems. Nevertheless, we explore striking differences among the federations in terms of presence and strength of regional parties, while our thorough comparative analysis of electoral turnout and parties support at federal and regional levels of elections reveals that federations are very different and sometimes unique. Also, we see that the theory of second-order elections does not work consistently which in our point of view means the decisive role of regional agenda and emphasizes the presence of national parties consistently inclined to local politics. We conclude that the development of partially autonomous subnational party systems and biases of electoral outcomes in federal and regional elections depend on the historical evolution of political institutions in the state rather than create similar patterns across the federations

Suggested Citation

  • Rostislav Turovsky & Elizabeth Luizidis, 2021. "Autonomy Of Subnational Party Systems: Comparative Analysis Of Federations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 77/PS/2021, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:77/ps/2021
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Robert Johns & James Mitchell & David Denver & Charles Pattie, 2009. "Valence Politics in Scotland: Towards an Explanation of the 2007 Election," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 57, pages 207-233, March.
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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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