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Income and vote switching between local and national elections: evidence from New York State

Author

Listed:
  • Raphael Franck

    (Bar Ilan University)

  • Samia Tavares

    (Rochester Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Between 1994 and 2004, New York State voters returned a Republican governor but always cast a majority of the popular vote in favor of the Democratic candidate in the presidential election. This paper exploits those elections in an effort to understand voters' motivations to switch party allegiances from presidential to gubernatorial elections. We argue that voters are likely to switch political allegiances between gubernatorial and presidential elections because they understand that the purpose of these elections is different. Using individual-level data, we find that low-income individuals are the main source of the switch in the vote.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphael Franck & Samia Tavares, 2008. "Income and vote switching between local and national elections: evidence from New York State," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(10), pages 1-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d70020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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