The Failure of Decoupling Liability and Other Mistakes in Tort Law
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Guiseppe Dari Mattiaci & F. Parisi, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A PrÃ©cis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991.
"Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," NBER Working Papers 3634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
More about this item
KeywordsThe ineffciency of decoupling liability; the impossibility of a have a party to take an efficient level of precaution; some problems with Shavell Theorem;
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-03 (All new papers)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42242. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .