On the Optimal Scope of Negligence
This article studies the optimal scope of negligence, considering which of the parties precautionary measures should be included in the determination of negligence and which instead should be omitted. The analysis shows that the optimal scope of negligence balances the gains derived from improved accident prevention with the administrative costs of the system. This approach also provides insights concerning not only the notions of care and activity level and their respective boundaries, but also the choice between strict liability and negligence.
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Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-447, June.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991.
"Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," NBER Working Papers 3634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-164, January.
- Gilles, Stephen G, 1992. "Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 319-363, June.
- Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1991. "Contingent Fees for Lawyers: The Impact on Litigation and Accident Prevention," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 381-399, June.
- Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
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