Impact of Family Ownership concentration on the Firm’s Performance: Evidence from Pakistani Capital Market
This study evaluates the impact family ownership on the firm‟s performance for the period of 2004 to 2009 considering a sample 29 manufacturing firms listed at KSE-100 index in the Pakistani capital market. The dependent variable is performance which is measured by ROA, ROE and Q of the sample firm and the independent variable is family ownership. Linear regression model is used for estimation along correlation analysis. The study reported positive relation between the ownership variable and performance variables. The results indicate negative association between the ownership variable and firm‟s dividend payment concluding that family control firms prefer to retain earning and investment opportunities rather to distribute the earnings. The empirical analysis reveal that the overall better governance practices have positive affect on financial decision. However, the firms with more family ownership do not adopt good practices and disclose less.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
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