Are CEO's paid their marginal product? An empirical analysis of executive compensation and corporate performance
The theory and reality of chief executive compensation is explored in this paper. The study here uses a panel of data on 143 executives from America’s largest corporations. The results suggest that earlier theoretical expectations and empirical findings of compressed wage scales may not hold when top-level managers are included.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1991|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Australian Bulletin of Labor No. 2.17(1991): pp. 118-131|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351.
- Kiviet, Jan F., 1985. "Model selection test procedures in a single linear equation of a dynamic simultaneous system and their defects in small samples," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 327-362, June.
- Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-71, September.
- Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
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