Disinvestment, lending relationships and executive compensation: Evidence from the Indian experience
The analysis employs data on federal Government-owned public enterprises (PSEs) since the 1980s that encompasses the partial privatization program to examine the likelihood of privatization. The results indicate that employment-intensive, high-paying but less profitable firms are more likely to be privatized. In terms of lending relationships, the analysis indicates that private banks are the main bank for small firms and foreign banks are the main bank for large, established firms. State-owned banks are more likely to be associated with leveraged PSEs as compared to other bank groups. In terms of compensation policies in PSEs, the evidence testifies that bigger, established and leveraged PSE firms pay higher salaries.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Global Business Review 2.12(2011): pp. 213-235|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kay, J A & Thompson, D J, 1986. "Privatisation: A Policy in Search of a Rationale," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(381), pages 18-32, March.
- Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Zaidi, Rida, 2006.
"Bank ownership type and banking relationships,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3862, The World Bank.
- Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2000. "What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 26-56, January.
- Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
- Paul H. Malatesta & Kathryn L. DeWenter, 2001. "State-Owned and Privately Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 320-334, March.
- Guiso, Luigi & Minetti, Raoul, 2004. "Multiple Creditors and Information Rights: Theory and Evidence from US Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 4278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bishop, Matthew R. & Kay, John A., 1989. "Privatization in the United Kingdom: Lessons from experience," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 643-657, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32071. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.