A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem
This paper gives two examples to break through the revelation principle. Furthermore, the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold.
|Date of creation:||03 Jul 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roberto Serrano, 2003.
"The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,"
Economics Working Papers
0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation," MPRA Paper 30067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Quantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle," MPRA Paper 30653, University Library of Munich, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31988. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.