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Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms

Author

Listed:
  • Wu, Haoyang

Abstract

Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. Furthermore, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world too.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms," MPRA Paper 30072, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:30072
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30072/1/MPRA_paper_30072.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas R. Palfrey & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208.
    2. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-691, June.
    3. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-477, March.
    5. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    6. Wu, Haoyang, 2011. "On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation," MPRA Paper 30067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian implementation; Quantum game theory; Mechanism design;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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