Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. Furthermore, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world too.
|Date of creation:||05 Apr 2011|
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