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Analysis of WIMAX/BWA Licensing in India: A real option approach

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  • Sinha, Pankaj
  • Gupta, Akshay

Abstract

Indian Internet and broadband market has experienced very slow growth and limited penetration till now. The introduction of Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) is expected to aid in increasing the penetration of internet and broadband in India. The report sheds light on the guidelines and procedure used in 4G/BWA spectrum auction and presents comparative analysis of the competing technologies, providing the information about suitability of each technology available. Recently held 4G/ BWA spectrum auction saw enthusiastic participation by the industry and even saw some new entrants in Indian broadband market. Government benefited by Rs, 385bn that it earned as revenue from the auction of the spectrum and projected it as successful auction. However, the question remains if the auctions were efficient and whether they led to creation of value or will it prove to be burden to the telecom operators and will depress their balance sheet for years to come. The report uses both traditional valuation methods such as Discounted Cash Flow as well as Real Option approach to answer such questions. Using DCF analysis, the broadband subscribers have been forecasted to grow from present 13.77mn to 544mn by the end of 2025. The wireless subscribers are forecasted to be 70% of the total broadband subscribers after 5 years of roll out as it will be difficult to replace all wireline subscribers with wireless subscribers in India due to the high cost of wireless broadband and new technology. WiMAX is expected to increase its presence with time and reach 90mn subscribers from meager 0.35mn subscribers by 2025. Using industry wide cost of capital as 12.05%, the Net Present Value has been found Rs 221bn aggregate with an IRR of 17.1%. Using Real option approach, the value of license has been calculated as Rs 437bn which is 13.5% more than the spectrum fees paid by the operators. This mismatch, between the auction value and the correct value that should have been discovered by supply-demand dynamics, can be due to limited participants in BWA spectrum auctions and companies such as TATA and Reliance opting out of the auction process midway as well as uncertainty about acceptance of new technology with Indian subscribers.

Suggested Citation

  • Sinha, Pankaj & Gupta, Akshay, 2011. "Analysis of WIMAX/BWA Licensing in India: A real option approach," MPRA Paper 31280, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31280
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 74-96, March.
    2. Michel Benaroch & Robert J. Kauffman, 1999. "A Case for Using Real Options Pricing Analysis to Evaluate Information Technology Project Investments," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 70-86, March.
    3. Alleman, James, 0. "A new view of telecommunications economics," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-2), pages 87-92, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Di Bari & Giovanni Villani, 2023. "An Options Game approach to valuate broadband projects in a smart city context," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 1587-1601, April.
    2. Antonio Di Bari & Domenico Santoro & Maria Antonia Tarrazon-Rodon & Giovanni Villani, 2024. "The impact of polarity score on real option valuation for multistage projects," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 57-76, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    WiMAX; broadband; 3G spectrum; 4G; broadband wireless access; valuation; licensing; real option;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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