Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions" European Economic Review 2002 and at www.paulklemperer.org and "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses" Economic Journal 2002 and also at www.paulklemperer.org.)
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- Paul Klemperer & Ken Binmore, 2001.
"The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences,"
Economics Series Working Papers
2002-W04, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages C74-C96, March.
- Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2001. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses," Economics Papers 2002-W4, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Sep 2001.
- Binmore, Kenneth & Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," CEPR Discussion Papers 3214, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 2000.
"Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory,"
Economics Series Working Papers
2000-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA.
- Klemperer, Paul, 2000. "Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 2572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer, 2002.
"Using and Abusing Economic Theory,"
2003-W02, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Ewerhart II, Christian, 2002.
"A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
02-07, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001.
"The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany,"
SFB 373 Discussion Papers
2001,70, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Third Generation (UMTS) Spectrum Auction in Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 584, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1994.
"Auctions vs. Negotiations,"
NBER Working Papers
4608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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