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Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions

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  • Paul Klemperer

    (Nuffield College, Oxford University, Oxford, England)

Abstract

I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions" European Economic Review 2002 and at www.paulklemperer.org and "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses" Economic Journal 2002 and also at www.paulklemperer.org.)

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Some Observations on the British and German 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Papers 2002-W20, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    • Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0220
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    File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2002/w20/britishgerman3gfinal.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Using and Abusing Economic Theory," Economics Papers 2003-W02, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    2. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 74-96, March.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 1994. "Auctions vs. Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 924, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Moldovanu, Benny & Ewerhart II, Christian, 2002. "A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 02-07, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pantelis Koutroumpis & Martin Cave, 2018. "Auction design and auction outcomes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 275-297, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Telecommunications; Spectrum Auctions; 3G; UMTS; Bidding.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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