The Distribution of European Union Allowances (EUAs): Windfall Profits, Free Allocation and Auctions
The first half of the paper provides a brief overview of the European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS), and discusses how emission allowances have been allocated during the first two phases of the trading scheme. I then discuss the effects of auctioning off more emission allowances during Phase III of the EU ETS. I conclude that such a change would reduce the windfall profits of the initial allowance holders, and provide additional revenues that participating governments could use to support a variety of policies, some of which I discuss.
|Date of creation:||2010|
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- Hepburn, C. & Grubb, M. & Neuhoff, K. & Matthes , F. & Tse, M., 2006.
"Auctioning of EU ETS Phase II allowances: how and why?,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0644, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Cameron Hepburn & Michael Grubb & Karsten Neuhoff & Felix Matthes & Maximilien Tse, 2006. "Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 137-160, January.
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