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The transfer space

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  • Friedrich, T.

Abstract

Within the transfer space source and sink exchange material and energy to optimize their own productivity. Under certain conditions this optimization will lead to a productivity increase of the whole ensemble. The present day view that cooperation is the most productive interaction between organisms is an illusion. Whenever two not identically equipped parties meet with the potential to exchange substrates one party will become a source and the other a sink. This is realistically called exploitation. The outcome depends on the relation between fix cost, variable cost, productivity and affinity. Brute force and educational conditioning used by the sink take advantage of emotions to hide the real size of cost in exploitation. In case the transfer of substrates leads to increased productivity parts of the productivity might be reinvested to keep the exploited party. The lasting relationship is called wise exploitation. Wise exploitation may last for one or many generations depending on the use of breeding, brute force or education. All actions have to be viewed under thermodynamic considerations and the benefit must always exceed the cost to maintain a stable system. This hypothesis explains observations from catalytic networks to societies.

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  • Friedrich, T., 2010. "The transfer space," MPRA Paper 23643, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23643
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, Eric & Foley, Duncan K., 2008. "Classical thermodynamics and economic general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 7-65, January.
    2. Ulrich Witt, 2006. "Evolutionary concepts in economics and biology," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 16(5), pages 473-476, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Friedrich, T., 2012. "The dynamics of exploitation in ensembles of source and sink," MPRA Paper 36708, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    source; sink; wise exploitation; brute force; education; emotions; fix cost; variable cost; productivity; game theory; cooperation; prisoners´ dilemma; benefit; cost; transfer space; symbiosis;

    JEL classification:

    • J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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