Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist (2009) asked whether there exists a two-person moving-knife procedure that yields an envy-free, undominated, and equitable allocation of a pie. We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the second yields an allocation with the two “almosts” removed. The latter, however, requires broadening the definition of a “procedure," which raises philosophical, as opposed to mathematical, issues. An analogous approach for cakes fails because of problems in eliciting truthful preferences.
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- Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001.
"Competitive Fair Division,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 418-443, April.
- I. D. Hill, 2008. "Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-division Procedures," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 171(4), pages 1032-1033.
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