The Federal Approach to FiscalDecentralisation: Conceptual Contours for Policy Makers
Chanchal Kumar Sharma,in his paper demonstrates that in order for fiscal decentralisation to be effective, it must be approached federally. A federal approach is not a decentralised approach but a dynamically balanced approach; one that constantly keeps on adjusting the contrasting forces of centralisation and decentralisation to create a system that can ensure good governance in accordance with the rapidly changing global and local scenario. According to the author, the good governance of the present time has to be federally flexible and dynamically decentralised and institutions of fiscal federalism are crucial for achieving such a dynamic equilibrium. Fiscal decentralisation cannot be detached from the broader principles of fiscal federalism if it is to be successful, irrespective of the fact of whether it is being carried out in a federal or non-federal country. He argues that too much decentralisation or an overly strong central federal government precludes the survival of a constitutional federal state.
|Date of creation:||May 2003|
|Date of revision:||May 2005|
|Publication status:||Published in Loyola Journal of Social Sciences No.(2).Vol. ((2005): pp. 169-188|
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