Preference for Income Taxation with Several Heterogeneous Consumers
The dominance of income over commodity taxation for the single consumer case, implies that if the consumer is asked about what tax she would pay to bear a given tax burden, she would choose income taxation. This paper provides a version of this preference for income taxation for the case of several heterogeneous consumers by means of a game where the government allows each consumer to choose between the two tax regimes.
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