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Endogenous location and pricing policy: mixed strategies make uniform pricing commitment successful

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  • Aguirre, Iñaki

Abstract

We study the strategic choice of spatial price policy (uniform pricing versus spatial price discrimination) in a linear city with quadratic transport costs and endogenous locations, under two alternative three-stage game orderings (following Eber, 1997). The asymmetric subgame (in which one firm discriminates while the other prices uniformly) is solved via the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium under simultaneous price competition, replacing the Stackelberg standard of Thisse and Vives (1988). In Game I (location-pricing policy-prices), the policy game is a coordination game: both are Nash equilibria but mutual uniform pricing Pareto dominates mutual discrimination. This overturns the Prisoner’s Dilemma that arises under the Stackelberg standard, in which price discrimination is a dominant strategy. In Game II (pricing policy-location-prices), mutual uniform pricing is the unique equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Aguirre, Iñaki, 2026. "Endogenous location and pricing policy: mixed strategies make uniform pricing commitment successful," MPRA Paper 129636, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:129636
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lederer, Phillip J & Hurter, Arthur P, Jr, 1986. "Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 623-640, May.
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    3. Qihong Liu & Konstantinos Serfes, 2004. "Quality of Information and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 671-702, December.
    4. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2015. "Should Firms Employ Personalized Pricing?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 887-903, October.
    5. Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Vives, Xavier, 1988. "On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 122-137, March.
    6. d'Aspremont, C & Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, J-F, 1979. "On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1145-1150, September.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • R32 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis

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