IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/128053.html

Queueing and Scheduling Problems with Multiple Servers

Author

Listed:
  • Banerjee, Sreoshi
  • Trudeau, Christian

Abstract

We examine the implications of extending the queueing and scheduling problems from the single-server to the multiple-server cases. In particular, we discuss three assumptions on job divisibility: jobs can be assumed to be indivisible (must be processed continuously on a single server), discretely divisible (a job can be divided in a series of unit-length tasks that can be processed simultaneously on multiple servers) or continuously divisible (a job can be divided in intervals as small as desired). We examine if the corresponding optimistic and pessimistic cost functions (in which we assume that a group is served first and last, respectively) satisfy the properties of convexity/concavity and 2-additivity. Our results show that with multiple servers, while all properties hold under continuous divisibility, they largely fail otherwise. In particular, 2-additivity does not carry over, and pessimistic functions are no longer concave. Optimistic functions retain the convexity property in most cases. These negative results indicate that multi-server problems require fundamentally new analytical approaches, as single-server techniques do not generalize. We also establish that the anticore of the optimistic function is always a non-empty subset of the core of the pessimistic function, providing bounds even when classical properties fail.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Sreoshi & Trudeau, Christian, 2026. "Queueing and Scheduling Problems with Multiple Servers," MPRA Paper 128053, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:128053
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/128053/1/MPRA_paper_128053.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:128053. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.