IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v137y2025ics0165489625000319.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cost-symmetric transfer rules for queueing with arrivals

Author

Listed:
  • Han, Changyong
  • Chun, Youngsub

Abstract

For the queueing problem with arrivals, we investigate the implications of equal treatment of equal costs, which requires that two agents with the same unit waiting cost should end up with the same utility. We introduce the cost-symmetric min-transfer rule and show that it is the only rule satisfying efficiency, Pareto indifference, and independence of larger costs together with equal treatment of equal costs. This rule coincides with the minimal transfer rule (Maniquet, 2003) in the static queueing problem. On the other hand, by replacing independence of larger costs with independence of smaller costs, we characterize the cost-symmetric max-transfer rule, which coincides with the maximal transfer rule (Chun, 2006b) in the static queueing problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Han, Changyong & Chun, Youngsub, 2025. "Cost-symmetric transfer rules for queueing with arrivals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:137:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000319
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102416
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489625000319
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102416?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:137:y:2025:i:c:s0165489625000319. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.