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Lorenz optimality for sequencing problems with welfare bounds

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  • Banerjee, Sreoshi
  • Mitra, Manipushpak

Abstract

In the sequencing context, we explore the possibility of designing mechanisms which uphold the notion of justness and safeguard an agent’s individual interest. Every agent is guaranteed a minimum level of utility by imposing the generalized minimum welfare bound. Our main result shows that the constrained egalitarian mechanism is Lorenz optimal in the class of mechanisms that are feasible and satisfy the generalized minimum welfare bound.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Sreoshi & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2021. "Lorenz optimality for sequencing problems with welfare bounds," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:205:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521002408
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109963
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Banerjee, Sreoshi & De, Parikshit & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2020. "A welfarist approach to sequencing problems with incentives," MPRA Paper 107188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-635, May.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1991. "Constrained egalitarian allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 403-422, November.
    4. Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2019. "Egalitarianism in the queueing problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 48-56.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sequencing; Feasibility; Generalized minimum welfare bound; Lorenz criterion; Constrained egalitarianism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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