The Impact of Price Controls on Mandatory Automobile Insurance Markets
This is a theoretical paper that models a mandatory automobile insurance market using a partial equilibrium concept where automobile insurance is one good and a composite good represents all others. Price controls, heterogeneous service, administrative, and adjusting costs, as well as capital reserves and capital costs are all included in this simple model.
|Date of creation:||31 Dec 2006|
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Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Cummins, J David & Mahul, Olivier, 2003. " Optimal Insurance with Divergent Beliefs about Insurer Total Default Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 121-38, October.
- Doherty, Neil A & Schlesinger, Harris, 1990. "Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration of Contract Nonperformance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 243-53, February.
- Cagle, Julie A B & Harrington, Scott E, 1995. "Insurance Supply with Capacity Constraints and Endogenous Insolvency Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 219-32, December.
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