Existence of pure strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth games with imperfect divisibility of money
This paper incorporates imperfect divisibility of money in a price game where a given number of identical firms produce a homogeneous product at constant unit cost up to capacity. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Unlike in the continuous action space case, under discrete pricing there may be a range of symmetric pure strategy equilibria - which we fully characterize - a range which may or may not include the competitive price. Also, we determine the maximum number of such equilibria when competitive pricing is itself an equilibrium.
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- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2008.
"Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 746-761, May.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-12, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2007. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms," MPRA Paper 3353, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 113-116.
- Dixon, Huw David, 1993. "Integer Pricing and Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly with Strictly Convex Costs: Is It Worth More Than a Penny?," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 257-68, July.
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