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Δημοκρατικότητα Και Μη Συμβατικά Μέτρα Της Κεντρικής Τράπεζας; Μια Ιστορική Θεώρηση Της Αμερικανικής Πιστωτικής Πολιτικής Σε Σχέση Με Την Ανισοκατανομή Εισοδήματος
[How democratic are the unconventional measures of the central bank? A Historical View of US Credit Policy in Relation to Income Inequality]

Author

Listed:
  • Economou, Emmanouel/Marios/Lazaros

Abstract

Το παρόν άρθρο πραγματοποιεί μια ιστορική αναδρομή αναφορικά με τις μεταβολές της νομισματικής πολιτικής στις ΗΠΑ μέσα από τις επιτυχημένες ή μη πολιτικές της κεντρικής τράπεζας που η χώρα βίωσε με τη Μεγάλη Ύφεση του 1929 αλλά και την πρόσφατη χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση του 2008, επιχειρώντας την εξαγωγή χρήσιμων συμπερασμάτων. Στόχος της ανάλυσης είναι η συσχέτιση της δημοκρατικότητας στη λήψη αποφάσεων με τη δημιουργία ανισοτήτων μεταξύ των οικονομικών μονάδων λόγω της διαφορετικής εφαρμογής νομισματικής πολιτικής. Διεξάγεται μια κριτική θεώρηση των νομισματικών συστημάτων πρόσδεσης με τον χρυσό και της πρόσφατης πολιτικής ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης. Η ανάλυση καταλήγει στο ότι ενώ υπάρχουν επιχειρήματα υπέρ και κατά της άποψης υπέρ της ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης ή της επιστροφής σε μια εκδοχή του κανόνα του χρυσού, η εφαρμογή του τελευταίου είναι πολύ δύσκολο να εφαρμοστεί στην πράξη, κυρίως όταν μια οικονομία βρίσκεται σε φάση ύφεσης. Επιπλέον, η εφαρμογή ποσοτικής χαλάρωσης ή πολιτικών διάσωσης μεγάλων τραπεζών και ασφαλιστικών εταιριών, που συνοδεύεται με αυξημένες φορολογικές επιπτώσεις στους πολίτες θα πρέπει να συνδυάζεται με ζητήματα διαφάνειας και δημοκρατικότητας ως προς την λήψη πολιτικών αποφάσεων με οικονομικό υπόβαθρο.

Suggested Citation

  • Economou, Emmanouel/Marios/Lazaros, 2016. "Δημοκρατικότητα Και Μη Συμβατικά Μέτρα Της Κεντρικής Τράπεζας; Μια Ιστορική Θεώρηση Της Αμερικανικής Πιστωτικής Πολιτικής Σε Σχέση Με Την Ανισοκατανομή Εισοδήματος [How democratic are the unconventional measures of the central bank? A Historical V," MPRA Paper 107998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:107998
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • N11 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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