IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/102768.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Elite Quality Report 2020

Author

Listed:
  • Tomas, Casas i Klett
  • Guido, Cozzi

Abstract

Elites are an empirical inevitability, dominating all political economies. They provide necessary coordination capacity for the economy’s resources, whether human, financial or knowledge-based. By determining institutions that enable coordination, elites shape human and economic development, the destiny of societies, the wealth of nations, and their rise and fall. To sustain their position, elites run business models that accumulate wealth. High-quality elites run Value Creation business models that give more to society than they take. Low-quality elites do the opposite and operate Value Extraction models. We present the first-ever international measurement of Elite Quality, the Elite Quality Index (EQx) for 32 countries. We use 72 Indicators describing Value Creation Extraction. The Index architecture includes Power (Sub-Index I), a measurement of future Value Extraction potential, and Value itself (Sub-Index II) and 12 Pillars (e.g. Creative Destruction, Human Capture or Producer Rent).

Suggested Citation

  • Tomas, Casas i Klett & Guido, Cozzi, 2020. "Elite Quality Report 2020," MPRA Paper 102768, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:102768
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102768/1/MPRA_paper_102768.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Casas i Klett, Tomas & Cozzi, Guido & Diebold, Celine & Zeller, Camille, 2020. "Measuring Elite Quality," MPRA Paper 102068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 47-100.
    4. Łukasz Rachel & Lawrence H. Summers, 2019. "On Secular Stagnation in the Industrialized World," NBER Working Papers 26198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Matteo Mazziotta, Adriano Pareto, 2013. "Methods For Constructing Composite Indices: One For All Or All For One?," RIEDS - Rivista Italiana di Economia, Demografia e Statistica - The Italian Journal of Economic, Demographic and Statistical Studies, SIEDS Societa' Italiana di Economia Demografia e Statistica, vol. 67(2), pages 67-80, April-Jun.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Casas i Klett, Tomas & Cozzi, Guido & Diebold, Celine & Zeller, Camille, 2020. "Measuring Elite Quality," MPRA Paper 102068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Zuazu Bermejo, Izaskun, 2015. "Political Institutions, Technology and Growth: a dynamic panel approach," IKERLANAK 16266, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    3. Zuazu, Izaskun, 2019. "The growth effect of democracy and technology: An industry disaggregated approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 115-131.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    5. Georgios Symeonidis & Platon Tinios & Panos Xenos, 2020. "Enhancing Pension Adequacy While Reducing the Fiscal Budget and Creating Essential Capital for Domestic Investments and Growth: Analysing the Risks and Outcomes in the Case of Greece," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-17, December.
    6. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    7. Daniel Horn & Hubert Kiss Janos & Sára Khayouti, 2020. "Does trust associate with political regime?," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 2013, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    8. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    9. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2008. "Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(3), pages 1197-1250.
    10. Michele Peruzzi & Alessio Terzi, 2018. "Growth Accelerations Strategies," CID Working Papers 91a, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    11. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
    12. Lewkowicz, Jacek & Woźniak, Michał & Wrzesiński, Michał, 2022. "COVID-19 and erosion of democracy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    13. Bailey, James, "undated". "Can Health Spending Be Reined In through Supply Constraints? An Evaluation of Certificate-of-Need Laws," Working Papers 05192, George Mason University, Mercatus Center.
    14. H. Frech, 1973. "The public choice theory of murray N. Rothbard, a modern anarchist," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 143-154, March.
    15. Michiel Bijlsma & Wouter Elsenburg & Michiel van Leuvensteijn, 2010. "Four Futures for Finance; A scenario study," CPB Document 211.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    16. Hadzi-Vaskov, Metodij & Pienknagura, Samuel & Ricci, Luca Antonio, 2021. "The Macroeconomic Impact of Social Unrest," CEPR Discussion Papers 16152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2007. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 577-598, September.
    18. Edward P. Herbst & Benjamin K. Johannsen, 2020. "Bias in Local Projections," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-010r1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 04 Jan 2021.
    19. McShane, Michael K. & Cox, Larry A. & Butler, Richard J., 2010. "Regulatory competition and forbearance: Evidence from the life insurance industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 522-532, March.
    20. Johannes Blum & Klaus Gründler, 2020. "Political Stability and Economic Prosperity: Are Coups Bad for Growth?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8317, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Index; elite quality; institutions; value creation; rent seeking; crony capitalism.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:102768. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.