IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Effects of Vertical Separation and Access Price Regulation on Investment Incentives

  • Paula Sarmento

    ()

    (CEF.UP and Faculty of Economics of University of Porto)

We study the impact of vertical separation between an upstream firm and its subsidiary, which competes in the retail market with an independent firm, with the incentive to invest in network upgrade. This question is discussed under two alternative regimes concerning the price of the vital input sold by the upstream firm: cost orientation regulation and absence of access price regulation. We show that the investment incentive decreases with vertical separation under both regimes. However, it is not always true that the investment incentive is higher without regulation.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/workingpapers/11.04.04_wp410.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series FEP Working Papers with number 410.

as
in new window

Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:410
Contact details of provider: Postal: Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200 PORTO
Phone: 351-22-5571100
Fax: 351-22-5505050
Web page: http://www.fep.up.pt/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Øystein Foros & Hans Kind & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Managerial incentives and access price regulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 117-133, April.
  2. Beard, T Randolph & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 2001. "Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-33, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.