The Effects of Vertical Separation and Access Price Regulation on Investment Incentives
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, 2001. "Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-333, September.
- Øystein Foros & Hans Kind & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Managerial incentives and access price regulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 117-133, April.
- Beard, T Randolph & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 2001. "Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 319-333, September.
- Foros, Oystein, 2004. "Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-24, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ben Dkhil, Inès, 2014. "Regulation and Investment in Telecom Network Infrastructure Facilities: The Recent Developments and Debates," MPRA Paper 72910, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2015.
- Ben Dkhil, Inès, 2014. "Investment in Fixed Broadband Networks and Access Regulation in Developed and Developing countries: Panel Data Applications," MPRA Paper 59337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Höffler, Felix & Kranz, Sebastian, 2011. "Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 576-588, September.
- Ricardo GONCALVES & Álvaro NASCIMENTO, 2013. "Next Generation Access Networks: The Post-Investment Conundrum," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(92), pages 91-112, 4th quart.
- Hervas-Drane, Andres, 2011. "Non-cost-raising discrimination: A rationale for functional separation in broadband open access," IESE Research Papers D/942, IESE Business School.
- Allain, Marie-Laure & Chambolle, Claire & Rey, Patrick & Teyssier, Sabrina, 2021.
"Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Patrick Rey & Sabrina Teyssier, 2015. "Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: an experiment," Post-Print hal-02104547, HAL.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Patrick Rey & Sabrina Teyssier, 2021. "Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment," Post-Print hal-03283879, HAL.
- Marie-Laure ALLAIN & Claire CHAMBOLLE & Patrick REY & Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2020. "Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up: an Experiment," Working Papers 2020-09, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Allain, Marie-Laure & Chambolle, Claire & Rey, Patrick & Teyssier, Sabrina, 2020. "Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up: an Experiment," TSE Working Papers 20-1062, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Patrick Rey & Sabrina Teyssier, 2021. "Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: An experiment," Post-Print hal-03341440, HAL.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Patrick Rey & Sabrina Teyssier, 2017. "Vertical integration as a source of hold-up: an experiment," Post-Print hal-02104564, HAL.
- Brennan, Timothy J., 2011. "Energy Efficiency Policy: Surveying the Puzzles," RFF Working Paper Series dp-11-27, Resources for the Future.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2009.
"Access Charge, Vertical Separation, and Lobbying,"
Discussion Papers
2009-11, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2011. "Access charges, vertical separation, and lobbying," ISER Discussion Paper 0810, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Sappington, David E.M., 2006. "On the design of input prices: Can TELRIC prices ever be optimal?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 197-215, June.
- Richard Cadman, 2016. "Three forms of BT Separation: Objectives, solutions and effects," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2016-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Höffler, Felix & Kranz, Sebastian, 2007. "Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between Vertical Integration and Separation," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 15/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Mantian Xue, 2022. "“Spare Wheel” R&D in vertically related markets," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(4), pages 1105-1112, June.
- P. Dogan, "undated".
"Vertical Networks, Integration, and Connectivity,"
Working Paper
33644, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Dogan, Pinar, 2005. "Vertical Networks, Integration, and Connectivity," Working Paper Series rwp05-061, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Dogan, Pinar, 2009. "Vertical Networks, Integration, and Connectivity," Scholarly Articles 4863169, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Patrick Rey, 2016.
"Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up,"
Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 1-25.
- Allain, Marie-Laure & Rey, Patrick & Chambolle, Claire, 2014. "Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up," TSE Working Papers 14-525, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Patrick Rey, 2016. "Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up," Post-Print hal-03523213, HAL.
- Allain, Marie-Laure & Rey, Patrick & Chambolle, Claire, 2014. "Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up," IDEI Working Papers 836, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Claire Chambolle & Patrick Rey, 2015. "Vertical Integration as a Source of Hold-up," Post-Print hal-03283942, HAL.
- Sugimoto, Kota, 2021. "Ownership versus legal unbundling of electricity transmission network: Evidence from renewable energy investment in Germany," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
- Roland Meyer, 2011. "Vertical Economies and the Costs of Separating Electricity Supply-A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Literature," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0006, Bremen Energy Research.
- Dennis Weisman, 2014. "Safe harbor input prices and market exclusion," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 226-236, October.
- Stefan Buehler & Dennis Gärtner & Daniel Halbheer, 2006.
"Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-quality Tradeoffs,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 99-115, July.
- Stefan Buehler & Dennis Gaertner & Daniel Halbheer, 2004. "Deregulating Network Industries: Dealing with Price-Quality Tradeoffs," SOI - Working Papers 0402, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2005.
- Prandini, Alberto, 2007. "Good, BETTA, best? The role of industry structure in electricity reform in Scotland," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1628-1642, March.
- Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006.
"Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
- Mark Armstrong & David Sappington, 2005. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Industrial Organization 0505011, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Oct 2005.
- Growitsch, Christian & Müller, Gernot & Stronzik, Marcus, 2008. "Ownership Unbundling in der Gaswirtschaft: Theoretische Grundlagen und empirische Evidenz," WIK Discussion Papers 308, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
- Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
More about this item
Keywords
access price regulation; vertical integration; investment incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2011-04-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-NET-2011-04-09 (Network Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-04-09 (Regulation)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fepuppt.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.