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Money or Credit, Operationalised: A Comment on Digital Money (The Future of Banking 8)

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  • Allan Pedersen

Abstract

Is a digital euro-claim that promises to be worth one euro a new kind of money, or a new kind of bank? And does the answer depend on who issues it? Digital Money, the eighth Future of Banking report (Cecchetti, Niepelt, Rey and Vives, CEPR Press / IESE, 2026), gives the right answer to the first question and most of the right answer to the second. It treats digital money as a question of monetary architecture rather than technology, judges instruments by the institutions that stand behind them, likens stablecoins to money-market funds, and concludes that tokenised bank deposits are the better-positioned form of private digital money. This comment agrees, and is offered in that spirit. It adds five refinements from two vantage points the report, working globally and at the level of principle, had less room to develop: the operational detail of the European Union's Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), and the economic history of offshore money. First, the report's verdict that "MiCA provides no central-bank backstop" is true of only half the regime, because the issuer is the fork. Second, the three-country comparison gains from an organising principle, a trilemma between par stability, private credit and the absence of a backstop. Third, "functional equivalence" is necessary but not sufficient, because the legal category still governs which risks supervisors are told to watch. Fourth, the report passes over a concrete consumer-protection gap that its own conclusion implies. Fifth, "no backstop" is, at systemic scale, an illusion, and saying so sharpens the report's strongest point into a clean policy choice. Two of the five are external to the report: the bank/non-bank split inside MiCA's own e-money-token category, and a deposit-guarantee gap that reaches even bank-issued tokens. The other three reformulate the report's own logic rather than contest it.

Suggested Citation

  • Allan Pedersen, 2026. "Money or Credit, Operationalised: A Comment on Digital Money (The Future of Banking 8)," Philosophers Mint Working Papers 5, Philosophers Mint.
  • Handle: RePEc:pmt:wpaper:5
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.7131481
    Note: A comment on Cecchetti, S., Niepelt, D., Rey, H. and Vives, X., Digital Money, The Future of Banking 8, CEPR Press / IESE (2026). Companion papers: RePEc:pmt:wpaper:2 and RePEc:pmt:wpaper:3. Also available on SSRN (10.2139/ssrn.7131481).
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Allan Pedersen, 2026. "Money or Credit? MiCA's Stablecoin Hybrid and the Direction of the 2026 Review," Philosophers Mint Working Papers 2, Philosophers Mint.
    3. Iñaki Aldasoro & Perry Mehrling & Daniel H. Neilson, . "On par: a money view of stablecoins," Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures.
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    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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