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Regulatory Bodies: Hurting Growth And Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Nadeem Ul Haque

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Islamabad)

  • Ahmed Waqar Qasim

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Islamabad)

Abstract

Markets thrive when practices are encoded into rules and regulations. The common myth in Pakistan seems to be that markets need to be checked and controlled, implying that regulation is to prevent market development. Indeed, markets do not thrive without good regulations. A large amount of time is wasted in the “government or markets†debate when the evidence clearly shows that government regulation is required to fuel market growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadeem Ul Haque & Ahmed Waqar Qasim, 2022. "Regulatory Bodies: Hurting Growth And Investment," PIDE Monograph Series 2022:4, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:pid:monogr:2022:4
    as

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    File URL: https://file.pide.org.pk/uploads/ms-10-regulatory-bodies-hurting-growth-and-investment.pdf
    File Function: First Version, 2022
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Harrington & John M. Vernon, 2005. "Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 4, volume 1, number 026222075x, December.
    3. Nadeem Ul Haque & Hanid Mukhtar & Nohman Ishtiaq & John Gray, 2020. "Doing Development Better," PIDE Books, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, number 2020:3, December.
    4. Nadeem Ul Haque & Raja Rafi Ullah, 2020. "Estimating the Footprint of Government on the Economy," PIDE-Working Papers 2020:26, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    5. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    6. Robert Tannenwald, 1997. "State regulatory policy and economic development," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 83-108.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rasta-Pide, 2023. "The State Of Commerce In Pakistan: International & Domestic," PIDE Research Report 2023:15, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    2. Paarlberg, Robert & Bhattacharya, Anjanabha & Huang, Jikun & Karembu, Margaret & Pray, Carl & Wesseler, Justus, 2024. "Viewpoint: The uptake of new crop science: Explaining success, and failure," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. Bansal, Vaiddehi & Wallach, Jessica & Lira Brandão, Juliana & Lord, Sarah & Taha, Ninar & Akoglu, Tulay & Kiss, Ligia & Zimmerman, Cathy, 2023. "An intervention-focused review of modern slave labor in Brazil’s mining sector," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).

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