How Best to Auction Natural Resources
I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and simple value structures, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids likely is needed to promote efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take by reducing oil or mining company risk.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:||2009|
|Publication status:||Published in Philip Daniel, Brenton Goldsworthy, Michael Keen, and Charles McPherson (eds.), Handbook of Oil, Gas And Mineral Taxation, Chapter 10, forthcoming, Washington, DC: IMF|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211|
Phone: (202) 318-0520
Fax: (202) 318-0520
Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
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