Expectational Bottlenecks and the Emerging of New Organizational Forms
In this article we discuss the dynamics of organizational change when agents have heterogeneous initial conjectures and do learn. In this framework, conjectural equilibrium is defined as a steady state of the learning process, and all the adjustment occurs in disequilibrium. We discuss the properties of the system under different “rationality” assumptions, and using well-known learning algorithms. We prove analytically that multiplicity of equilibria, and failure of good organizational routines, cannot be ruled out: better, they are fairly probable. Stability is a crucial matter: it is shown to depend on initial conjectures. Finally, learning does not necessarily select the best.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via S. Felice, 5 - 27100 Pavia|
Web page: http://dipartimenti.unipv.eu/on-dip/epmq/Home.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Francesco Bogliacino & Giorgio Rampa, 2009.
"Quality Risk Aversion, Conjectures, and New Product Diffusion,"
Quaderni di Dipartimento
092, University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods.
- Francesco Bogliacino & Giorgio Rampa, 2012. "Quality risk aversion, conjectures, and new product diffusion," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(5), pages 1081-1115, November.
- Francesco Bogliacino & Giorgio Rampa, 2009. "Quality Risk Aversion, Conjectures, and New Product Diffusion," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2009_27, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI), Brussels.
- Giovanni Dosi & Marco Grazzi, 2010. "On the nature of technologies: knowledge, procedures, artifacts and production inputs," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(1), pages 173-184, January.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1999.
"Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,"
NBER Working Papers
7403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1882, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Giovanni Dosi & Marco Grazzi, 2006. "Technologies as problem-solving procedures and technologies as input--output relations: some perspectives on the theory of production," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 173-202, February.
- Bogliacino, F & Rampa, G, 2009.
"Monopolistic Competition and New Products: A Conjectural Equilibrium Approach,"
15120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Francesco Bogliacino & Giorgio Rampa, 2010. "Monopolistic competition and new products: a conjectural equilibrium approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 5(1), pages 55-76, June.
- Sidney G. Winter, 2006.
"Toward a neo-Schumpeterian theory of the firm,"
Industrial and Corporate Change,
Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 125-141, February.
- Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 221-254, February.
- Arthur, W Brian, 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 116-31, March.
- Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
- Cimoli, Mario & Dosi, Giovanni & Stiglitz, Joseph E. (ed.), 2009. "Industrial Policy and Development: The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199235278, May.
- Giovanni Dosi & Daniel A. Levinthal & Luigi Marengo, 2003.
"Bridging contested terrain: linking incentive-based and learning perspectives on organizational evolution,"
Industrial and Corporate Change,
Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 413-436, April.
- Giovanni Dosi & Daniel Levinthal & Luigi Marengo, 2001. "Bridging Contested Terrain: Linking Incentive-Based and Learning Perspectives on Organizational Evolution," LEM Papers Series 2001/20, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- J. v. Neumann, 1945. "A Model of General Economic Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-9.
- Dosi, Giovanni, 1988. "Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 1120-71, September.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pav:wpaper:159. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paolo Bonomolo)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.