What Sort of People Vote Expressively?
Using a survey and an experiment, we identify the personal characteristics associated with the difference between an individual's giving to charity and her vote in a referendum on charitable giving. Under certain circumstances, high levels of self-reported trust and happiness, and participation in social group activities, are associated with expressive voting for high levels of charitable giving. However, the sequencing of the experiments is of crucial importance. The 'warm glow' of expressive voting can influence subsequent individual decisions, and the 'cold shower' of individual selfishness can influence subsequent collective decisions.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2011|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +64 3 479 8725
Fax: 64 3 479 8171
Web page: http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/econ
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Douglas Davis & Edward Millner & Robert Reilly, 2005. "Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 85-106, June.
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2003. "Rebate versus matching: does how we subsidize charitable contributions matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 681-701, March.
- Alvin Etang & David Fielding & Stephen Knowles, 2011.
"Does trust extend beyond the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon,"
Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 15-35, March.
- Alvin Etang Ndip & David Fielding & Stephen Knowles, 2009. "Does trust extend beyond the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon," Working Papers 0907, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2009.
- Reiner Eichenberger & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1998.
"Rational moralists: The role of fairness in democratic economic politics,"
Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 191-210, January.
- Eichenberger, Reiner & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1998. " Rational Moralists: The Role of Fairness in Democratic Economic Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 191-210, January.
- Jean-Robert Tyran & Rupert Sausgruber, 2002.
"A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy,"
University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002
2002-30, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Tyran, Jean-Robert & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2006. "A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 469-485, February.
- Bischoff, Ivo & Egbert, Henrik, 2008. "Bandwagon voting or false-consensus effect in voting experiments? First results and methodological limits," Discussion Papers 38, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Center for international Development and Environmental Research (ZEU).
- Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:otg:wpaper:1101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Janet Bryant)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.