IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/stw6y_v1.html

Fines, Not Fares: The Punitive Nature of Transit Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Linovski, Orly

Abstract

Despite calls for reform, many transit agencies rely heavily on enforcement to increase fare revenue and perceptions of safety. Both fare evasion and behaviour violations (like loitering and public intoxication) can carry heavy fines, and lead to debt collection and criminal justice system involvement. Yet, there has been limited examination of the financial and social costs of transit fines, and whether enforcement programs can achieve revenue goals. Using administrative data obtained through freedom of information requests, I document the nature and extent of transit enforcement and fines in sixteen Canadian cities. I find that transit fines are excessively punitive when compared with parking violations, with fines on average five times higher than similar parking infractions. While there may be deterrence value from enforcement, few transit fines are paid, and the costs of enforcing transit violations are likely significantly greater than revenue from payments. Given this, transit agencies should evaluate the goals, impacts, and outcomes of enforcement programs, with a full accounting of both the financial and social costs, and consideration of alternative programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Linovski, Orly, 2025. "Fines, Not Fares: The Punitive Nature of Transit Enforcement," SocArXiv stw6y_v1, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:stw6y_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/stw6y_v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/69494832f0588ddab6cff69e/
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/stw6y_v1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian Taylor & Eric Morris, 2015. "Public transportation objectives and rider demographics: are transit’s priorities poor public policy?," Transportation, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 347-367, March.
    2. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nakashima, Kiyotaka & Ogawa, Toshiaki, 2020. "The Impacts of Strengthening Regulatory Surveillance on Bank Behavior: A Dynamic Analysis from Incomplete to Complete Enforcement of Capital Regulation in Microprudential Policy," MPRA Paper 99938, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Jan Eeckhout & Nicola Persico & Petra E. Todd, 2010. "A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 1104-1135, June.
    4. Ghulam Shabbir & Mumtaz Anwar & Shahid Adil, 2016. "Corruption, Political Stability and Economic Growth," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 689-702.
    5. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A note on the complementarity of uniform emission standards and monitoring strategies," Working Papers 2009/12, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    6. Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2006. "Bayesian Juries and The Limits to Deterrence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 70-86, April.
    7. Waldfogel, Joel, 1995. "Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 107-139, April.
    8. Spaeter, Sandrine & Verchère, Alban, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 71.
    9. Soham Baksi & Pinaki Bose, 2007. "Credence Goods, Efficient Labelling Policies, and Regulatory Enforcement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(2), pages 411-430, June.
    10. Kantorowicz-Reznichenko Elena, 2015. "Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay More?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 481-501, November.
    11. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
    12. Weixin Yang & Lingguang Li, 2017. "Efficiency Evaluation and Policy Analysis of Industrial Wastewater Control in China," Energies, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-18, August.
    13. Holz-Rau, Christian & Scheiner, Joachim, 2020. "Raum und Verkehr - ein Feld komplexer Wirkungsbeziehungen: Können Interventionen in die gebaute Umwelt klimawirksame Verkehrsemissionen wirklich senken?," Forschungsberichte der ARL: Aufsätze, in: Reutter, Ulrike & Holz-Rau, Christian & Albrecht, Janna & Hülz, Martina (ed.), Wechselwirkungen von Mobilität und Raumentwicklung im Kontext gesellschaftlichen Wandels, volume 14, pages 76-101, ARL – Akademie für Raumentwicklung in der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft.
    14. Timothy Stanley, 1995. "Optimal Penalties for Concealment of Crime," Law and Economics 9507001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Dec 1995.
    15. Isaac Ehrlich, 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 43-67, Winter.
    16. Dahm, Matthias & González, Paula & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2018. "The enforcement of mandatory disclosure rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 21-32.
    17. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Organized crime, corruption and punishment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1639-1663, September.
    18. Shulamit Kahn & Kevin Lang, 1987. "Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency vs. Specific-Capital," NBER Working Papers 2238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Michael J. Smart & Nicholas J. Klein, 2020. "Disentangling the role of cars and transit in employment and labor earnings," Transportation, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 1275-1309, June.
    20. Hugh Gravelle & Nuno Garoupa, 2002. "Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defense Expenditure," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(3), pages 366-379, July.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:stw6y_v1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.